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On Collegiality
Michael L. Seigel
Let's start with a hypothetical. Assume that you are the chief executive
officer of Widget Corporation, an enterprise with 200 employees. You have
received a series of complaints about a midlevel manager, let's call him Zeus,
from inside the company. The complaints are consistent. Zeus is hot-
tempered, ill-mannered, and underhanded. He verbally abuses colleagues in
the halls and by e-mail; he disrupts meetings, usually by shouting down peers
who dare to differ with him; he disparages coworkers both openly and clandes-
tinely; he employs surreptitious tactics to block corporate decisions with which
he disagrees; and he openly flaunts his contempt for corporate management.
The complainers contend that Zeus's conduct is destroying morale and dam-
aging productivity. You examine Zeus's personnel file and determine that he
is a slightly better than average employee in terms of individual output and
work ethic. Clients appear satisfied, though not ecstatic, with his service. You
know from experience that Zeus's job is not difficult to fill: the last time you
advertised for a similar position, 300 qualified persons applied. With all this in
mind, you set up a meeting with Zeus to counsel him about his behavior. At
the meeting Zeus tells you to get lost. Now you must decide what to do.
Unlike most law professor hypotheticals, the answer to this one is simple.
You would fire Zeus. There is simply no reason, legal or otherwise, that you
would tolerate a disruptive and insubordinate employee with ubiquitous job
skills. Indeed, Zeus's job with Widget might be his last in the industry, assum-
ing prospective employers were to call Widget Corporation for a reference.
Now vary the hypothetical a bit. Instead of the CEO of Widget Corporation,
you are the dean of a large law school. Zeus is not a midlevel manager; he is a
law professor with tenure. Would you fire Zeus? If you are a typical dean, the
answer is almost certainly no. You would likely throw your hands up and urge
Zeus's colleagues to grin and bear him. Many of them would be unhappy,
but-notwithstanding their unhappiness-most of them would probably sup-
port your decision. They'd do their best to carry on despite Zeus's disruptive
behavior. A number of them would even champion Zeus's "right" to be
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"outspoken," "contrary," or, if he's old enough, "cantankerous." To them,
Zeus is like the neo-Nazis who attempted to march in Skokie, Illinois, in the
late 1970s: unfortunate and repugnant, but a necessary evil, the cost of First
Amendment (in the case of Zeus, academic) freedom.
In the context of a law faculty, Zeus is the worst-case example of an
uncollegial colleague. If the discussion of law deans over dinner or at confer-
ences is any indication, many schools have at least one Zeus, and the unfortu-
nate ones have two or three.' In addition, all schools are likely to have one or
more faculty with at least some of Zeus's negative characteristics.' Although
legal academics generally tolerate their incivility, they do not do so quietly.
Complaining about and comparing notes on uncivil colleagues is common
practice. And the talk is not always idle. The atmosphere of an institution
affects its ability to retain quality faculty, and its reputation influences its
ability to recruit new ones. Indeed, sometimes disagreements at a school
become so great that open hostility erupts; in extreme cases, the situation gets
so out of control that it finds its way into the popular press, affecting the
school's external standing.
Interestingly, though much talked about in academic circles, collegiality
has received scant attention in academic writing.' It appears that members of
1. I have witnessed some of these conversations personally, having served as associate dean for
academic affairs at the University of Florida Levin College of Law from July 1, 1999, toJune
30, 2001. Although my interest in collegiality stems in part from my experience as associate
dean, I must stress that neither Zeus nor any other hypothetical person referenced in this
article is based upon any single colleague of mine at the University of Florida. Rather, for
purposes of illustration I have created fictitious characters and have fashioned examples
drawing from all aspects of my personal and professional experience, psychological and
other literature, and stories that I have heard (perhaps some apocryphal) about people at
other institutions and workplaces.
2. Indeed, on January 23, 2004, 1 spoke with the dean of a major U.S. law school who had
recently announced his intention to step down because, as he privately revealed, he'd grown
tired of dealing with the 15 to 18 Zeus-like characters on his faculty of about 40.
3. One recent and notable exception to this proposition is Gregory M. Heiser, Because the
Stakes Are So Small: Collegiality, Polemic, and Professionalism in Academic Employment
Decisions, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 385 (2004). Heiser analyzes the problem ofcollegialitv from a
sociological perspective and, interestingly, draws conclusions similar to those I reach through
a more pragmatic approach. Otherwise, a review of the literature turns up a few articles
discussing the legal implications of using collegiality as a criterion in the promotion and
tenure process. See, e.g., Mary Ann Connell & Fred G. Savage, Does Collegiality Count? 87
Academe 37, 37-40 (2001) <www.aap.org/publications/academe/Olnd/Olndcon.htm>
(2001); Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G_ Savage, The Role of Collegiality in Higher
Education Tenure, Promotion, and Termination Decisions, 27J. C. & U. L, 833 (2001)
[hereinafter The Role of Collegiality]; Edgar Dyer, Collegiality as a Factor in Faculty Employ-
ment Decisions at Public Colleges and Universities. A Selective Review of the Caselaw, 152
Educ. L. Rep. 455 (2001); Perry A. Zirkel, Mayberry v Dees: Collegiality as a Criterion for
Faculty Tenure, 12 Educ. L. Rep. 1053 (1983); Kent M. Week, Collegiality and the Quarrel-
some Professor, CLI Newsletter <www.collegelegal.com/lccolleg.htm> (last visited Feb. 2,
2003). Sometimes the topic of collegiality arises in articles that focus on the more general
issue of academics' professional ethics- See, e-g., Daniel Callahan, Should There Be an
Academic Code of Ethics? 53J. Higher Educ. 335, 337-38 (1982); Wendy Wassyng Roworth,
Professional Ethics, Day by Day, Academe 1 (2002) <www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/
02JF/02jfrow.htm>. Tellingly, a nunber of articles purporting to grapple with academic
ethics make no mention of collegiality. See, e.g., Diane M. Felicio &Jean Pieniadz, Ethics in
Higher Education: Red Flags and Grey Areas, 9 Fem. & Psychol. 53 (1999), Deborah L.
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the academy view collegiality, or the lack thereof, as a condition of employ-
ment-or a fact of life-rather than a subject of study and debate. This article
seeks to fill some of the void. The first part attempts to define the term
collegiality. It turns out that there is a wide disparity between formal definitions
and common usages of the word. With a working definition established, part
II looks at the strains on collegiality endemic to the academic setting and then
examines arguments for and against the institution of a norm of collegiality
on law faculties.4 This part also examines legal issues bearing on the subject,
particularly the perceived tension between enforcement of collegiality and
the protections provided by the doctrine of academic freedom. The conclu-
sions drawn in this section are that collegiality is beneficial and that enforcing
it is, on balance, a lawful and worthwhile goal. Part III examines methods of
promoting collegiality in law schools. It proposes that the best method is
faculty self-regulation, and it sets out for consideration a model Statement of
Academic Professional Responsibility. Part IV deals with the reality that,
unfortunately, some people will never be collegial. This part provides a partial
topography of such "difficult people" and suggests strategies to deal with
them. It ends with a look at some of the most contentious people around-
those suffering from debilitating (and from the recipient's perspective, infuri-
ating) psychological infirmities-and includes a close examination of border-
line personality disorder, or BPD. The premise underlying this section is that
an otherwise collegial faculty should not allow itself to be confounded by a
small number of impossibly antagonistic colleagues.
I. Defining Collegiality
A. Existing Usage
Collegiality is a term that appears to have taken on new meanings over time.
The word does not even appear in the 1983 edition of Webster's New Twenti-
eth Century Unabridged Dictionary, which is equally unhelpful in defining
collegial to mean "relating to... belonging to... [or] having the nature of a
college."' Perhaps reflecting an increasing use of the word, more recent
Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professors, 51J. Legal Educ. 158 (2001); George
M. Schurr, Toward a Code of Ethics for Academics, 53J. Higher Educ. 318 (1982); Michael
Scriven, Professorial Ethics, 53J. Legal Educ. 307 (1982) (focused primarily on the ethics of
teaching); David H. Vernon, Ethics in Academe-Afton Dekanal, 34 J. Legal Educ. 205
(1984).
Books devoted to the subject of politics and conflict in the academic setting typically
contain a chapter or two devoted to conflict among peers. See, e.g.,James L. Bess, Collegiality
and Bureaucracy in the Modern University 85-114 (New York, 1988); Cynthia Berryman-
Fink, Can We Agree to Disagree? Faculty-Faculty Conflict, in Mending the Cracks in the Ivory
Tower, ed. Susan A. Holton, 141 (Bolton, 1998); Raymond R. Leal, From Collegiality to
Confrontation: Faculty to Faculty Conflicts, in Conflict Management in Higher Education,
ed. Susan A. Holton, 19 (San Francisco, 1995); Karl Hostetler, Ethics of the Profession:
Complexities of Collegiality, Professionalism, Morality, and Virtue, in The Art and Politics of
College Teaching, 2d ed., eds. Karl D. Hostetler et al., 323 (New York, 2001).
4. Collegiality is an issue in every college and department of every university. Although much of
this article is of general applicability, the focus is on faculties of law.
5. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, 2d ed.,
356 (NewYork, 1983) [hereinafter Webster's 2d ed.].
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dictionaries contain a separate entry for collegiality. Nevertheless, the standard
dictionary definiion-"the relationship between colleagues"--is only a shadow
of actual usage. When a faculty member accuses a colleague of being uncollegial,
he typically means far more than that the colleague is refusing to have a
relationship with him. Rather, the comment is loaded with criticism of the
colleague's professional behavior.
On its way toward concluding that collegiality should not be an express
component of the promotion and tenure process in higher education, the
American Association of University Professors defines the term as "collabora-
tion and constructive cooperation."7 Though a bit closer to common usage
than the dictionary definition, this elucidation also misses the mark. For one
thing, it is overinclusive. Most law faculty rarely collaborate with fellow mem-
bers of their home institution, at least in connection with their scholarly
agenda. This is not because the average law teacher is uncollegial; rather, it is
because legal scholarship tends to be a solitary pursuit, often so specialized
that no two people on the same faculty share the expertise necessary for
productive collaboration. Similarly, a teacher may choose, at times, to be
uncooperative-if, for example, cooperation would mean participating in
some administrative objective set for the institution with which the teacher
disagrees-without such contrary behavior's bearing at all on the teacher's
degree of collegiality. Indeed, if it reflects the teacher's honest judgment
about the best interests of her institution, lack of cooperation may be an
extremely collegial act. In the end, one wonders whether the AAUP chose
such a clumsy definition of collegiality to make the task of rejecting it as a
criterion for faculty evaluation that much easier.8
The literature on collegiality provides only moderate assistance in fashion-
ing a definition. Collegiality has been variously defined as the ability to "'get
along,' 'fit in,' or 'work well with colleagues"'; 9 or to "'demonstrate good
academic citizenship,' or 'contribute to a collegial atmosphere.' 1 These
definitions are, on the whole, vague, circular, or both. Karl Hostetler's work-
ing definition-"collegiality means being a good colleague, being decent and
civil to other people"ll-is on the right track, but it too is rather indefinite.
Other scholars have approached the definition of collegiality through nega-
tive territory-for instance, characterizing the absence of collegiality as exhib-
iting "personality problems significant enough to ... reflect extreme and
disruptive behavior, '12 or engaging in actions "that unduly create hostile and
6. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, 3d ed., 445 (Spring-
field, Mass., 1993).
7. On Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty Evaluation <http://www.aaup.org/statements/
Redbook/collegia.htm> (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter On Collegiality].
8. The AAUP specifically recommends that collegiality be accounted for through evaluation of
the three traditional criteria on which academics are measured: teaching, scholarship, and
servic6. See id.
9. Connell & Savage, Does Collegiaity Count? supra note 3, at 1.
10. Connell & Savage, The Role of Collegiality, supra note 3, at 833.
11. Hostetler, supra note 3, at 324.
12. Tamar Lewin, 'Collegiality' as a Tenure Battleground, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2002, at 12.
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abrasive relationships with colleagues.," 3 Courts have also weighed in on the
matter, one defining collegiality as "the capacity to relate well and construc-
tively to the comparatively small bank of scholars on whom the fate of the
university rests." 4 This latter definition raises more questions than it answers.
Do colleagues truly need to "relate well" to each other? Or was the court
suggesting something more Machiavellian-that a faculty member needs to
get along with his institution's power-wielding insiders or risk endangering
his career?
Statements on good practices and professional ethics for university and law
teachers provide additional, but limited, aid in defining collegiality. Interest-
ingly, these statements shy away from explicit use of the term, though they
include some exhortations that most observers would consider as falling
uinder a collegiality umbrella. For instance, the AAUP's Statement on Profes-
sional Ethics declares, "Professors do not discriminate against or harass col-
leagues. They respect and defend the free inquiry of associates. In the ex-
change of criticism and ideas professors show due respect for the opinions of
others. Professors acknowledge academic debt and strive to be objective in
their professional judgment of colleagues.' 5
Similarly, the Association of American Law Schools' Statement of Good
Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional
Responsibilities contains a section devoted to "Responsibilities to Colleagues."
In this section, the AALS states that a law professor should (1) treat colleagues
with "civility and respect"; (2) ensure that junior faculty know that there will
be no adverse professional consequences from expressing or acting on beliefs
or opinions contrary to those of more senior faculty; (3) refrain from applying
any pressure other than persuasion on the merits in an effort to influence a
colleague's vote; (4) make promotion and tenure and other peer evaluations
exclusively on the merits; and (5) make himself reasonably available to col-
leagues for purposes of discussing teaching and scholarship. Finally, the
statement reminds law teachers not to commit sexual harassment or discrimi-
nation based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, disability or handicap, or political beliefs. 6 Although the AAUP and
AALS principles are laudable and surely have something to do with collegial-
ity, they appear to have been written without much analytical precision.
B. Definition
Out of this definitional labyrinth, one can begin to build a useful taxonomy
of the concept of collegiality. The most important differentiation is between
three levels of behavior: affirmative collegiality, passive collegiality, and affir-
13. Week, supra note 3, at 1. The definition appears to be derived from sociology, which
describes collegiality as a collection of attributes exhibited by a collegial-as opposed to a
bureaucratic-organization. In the aggregate, the attributes depict a group of professionals
who are formally equal and effectively self-governing. See Heiser, supra note 3, at 8-9.
14. Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 514 (4th Cir. 1981).
15. Available at <http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/Rbethics.htm> (June 1987).
16. Available at <http://www.aals.org/ethic.html> (Nov. 17, 1989).
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mative uncollegiality. This differentiation is critical because of the traditional
distinction in law and morality between aspirational, minimally acceptable,
and unacceptable behavior. Although it would be nice for all law teachers to
be affirmatively collegial-to be outstanding, even model colleagues-it is
acceptable for them to be passively collegial-in effect, to live and let live.
Only affirmatively uncollegial behavior should result in sanctions, to be dis-
cussed at greater length later in this article.
1. Baseline Collegiality
Let's examine the midlevel first. Here is a one-sentence definition for
baseline collegiality: conducting oneself in a manner that does not impinge upon the
ability of one's colleagues to do their jobs or on the capacity of one's institution to fulfill
its mission. This means, first and foremost, treating peers civilly, though not
necessarily cordially,"' and refraining from ad hominem attacks in any setting
and under any circumstances whatsoever. It implies doing one's job-teach-
ing, research, and service-at a minimally acceptable level, because if one is
not pulling one's institutional weight, somebody else has to make up the
difference. Essential collegiality also entails always acting in good faith, that is,
in concert with one's honest judgment as to the best interests of one's
institution. A passively collegial faculty member does not gratuitously attack or
impugn her home institution or its administration publicly or privately;"
likewise, she does not engage in disagreements with administrators or col-
leagues unless she honestly believes that disagreement is necessary to further
her own legitimate interests or the interests of her school.
For a passively collegial faculty member, means are just as important as
ends. Baseline collegiality requires that one conduct all disagreements with
civility and through means solely designed, as the AALS admonishes, to
persuade on the merits. Deceit, intimidation, corruption, and personal at-
tacks are not acceptable forms of behavior, regardless of the stakes. Finally,
baseline collegiality requires accepting the collective judgment of one's col-
leagues after an open and honest debate. There is nothing wrong with
fighting a good, clean, principled-even passionate-fight, but when the
battle is clearly lost, it is time to move on in good (or at least not bad) humor.
Prolonging doomed battles, or exhibiting only grudging and grousing accep-
tance of a new policy enthusiastically embraced by the majority, is selfish and
harmful to the institution.
In light of existing literature and common parlance, it is equally important
to delineate what passive collegiality does not encompass.' It certainly does
not mean that a faculty member needs to "fit in" with his colleagues.in any
fashion whatsoever. Academia is and should be a place where smart (perhaps
17. Civility can have many ieanings. I use it here in the traditional dictionary sense to mean
being polite, considerate, and courteous- Cordiality implies warmth and affection. Although it
is certainly rewarding when one develops a cordial relationship with at least some of one's
colleagues, the universal presence of civility is sufficient to maintain a collegial atmosphere.
18. The key word in this phrase is "gratuitously." Obviously, using public and private criticism of
existing institutional policy can be a very effective way to bring about change.
19. See Connell & Savage, Does Collegiality Count? supra note 3, at 1.
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brilliant) people who can't or don't want to fit in anywhere else (often
because they are not attuned to the mundane practical implications of knowl-
edge) are left to revel in their own scholarly devices, enabling them to further
humankind's search for knowledge in their own unique way. It is to be
expected that such individuals are unlikely to fit in with each other. Their
diversity-intellectual and otherwise-is cause for celebration, though it can
at times also be a cause of some administrative consternation. Nevertheless, as
long as each faculty member does her job and exhibits essential collegiality,
she can be as individualistic, eccentric, and downright odd as she cares (or was
born) to be.
Moreover, contrary to the AAUP's Statement on Professional Ethics, colle-
giality does not necessarily require "showing due respect for the opinion of
others."2" The question is what is meant by "respect." One definition of the
term is "to notice with special attention, to regard, to heed, [or] to consider."21
To the extent that simply considering the opinions of colleagues is an essen-
tial underpinning of civil discourse, then the AAUP is correct in proffering
respect as a requirement of professional or collegial conduct. But the notion
of respect is more commonly taken to mean "to view, treat, or consider with
some degree of reverence, deference or courtesy; to feel or show honor or
esteem for."2" This is emphatically not a requirement of baseline collegiality;
blindly or automatically deferring to the opinions of others runs counter to
the academic enterprise. Academics should be free to show complete and
utter contempt for intellectual positions with which they disagree. This kind
of free-for-all is the fuel of the academic engine." The key for maintaining
essential collegiality, however, is that lack of respect must be confined to the
opinion and not be directed at the person; all attacks must be focused on the
idea, not the individual espousing it. This is sometimes a fine distinction, but it
is a critical one.2'
As I've said, simple collegiality does not require a faculty member to
cooperate or collaborate with others-except to the extent that cooperation
or collaboration is otherwise a requirement of the job. There is nothing
20. Available at <http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/Rbethics.htm> (June 1987).
21. Webster's 2d ed., supra note 5, at 1542.
22. Id.
23. In fact, being witness to a heated intellectual debate during law school is probably what
caused me to become a law teacher myself. I was a student at Harvard in the early 1980s, when
a battle was raging between the advocates of critical legal studies, including Jerry Frug,
Duncan Kennedy, and Roberto Unger, and those defending legal formalism, led by Charles
Fried and others. The intensity of this intellectual debate can hardly be exaggerated. Frog, in
particular, regaled my Contracts class almost daily with the deconstruction of formalistic
thought. To his credit, although he mocked and belittled Fried's philosophical positions,
Frug never said a negative word about Fried personally. Then, in midsemester, he invited
Fried to teach our class and defend his principles. Fried accepted the invitation. I had never
been so intellectually challenged and exhilarated in my life. Of course, I was not privy to the
personal relationship between Frug and Fried, and can only hope that it was truly collegial.
24. It is for this reason that academics do need to be tolerant and thick-skinned. Suffering an
attack on one's closely held beliefs is undoubtedly difficult and upsetting, but it does not
mean that one has been victimized by lack of collegiality. It is the price one pays for
participation in academia.
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uncollegial, in its baseline sense, in refraining from unnecessary interaction
with colleagues or the administration. Thus a collegial person might be an
introvert or loner; these are simply a personality trait and lifestyle, respec-
tively, not problems. The picture is dramatically different, however, if others
cannot do their jobs without this person's interaction or assistance. Under
these circumstances, failure to act would violate the basic norm of collegiality.
For example, a law teacher who is not wild about his dean need not go out of
his way to attend, say, weekly school-sponsored brown-bag lunches with her.
An obligatory annual evaluation meeting, however, is a different matter. If the
disaffected teacher refuses to attend a required meeting with the dean, he is
acting uncollegially: he is failing to do his job, and he is preventing the dean
from doing hers.
2 5
As a second example, assume that faculty member X was hired as part of the
team that teaches the first-year legal research and writing course offered at
most American law schools. As part of his job, X is required to attend weekly
departmental meetings that are substantive and collaborative. In them, the
writing faculty assist each other in developing pedagogical strategies for
instructing students with special needs; they review common questions raised
by past assignments and formulate consistent answers; theyjointly edit drafts
of future writing assignments; and they monitor and adjust the course sylla-
bus. X refuses to attend these meetings, claiming that they are a waste of his
time. He obtains the minutes of each meeting, however, uses all of the joint
problems, and follows the prescribed syllabus. He gets outstanding teaching
evaluations from both students and peers.
Under the circumstances described, X's refusal to participate in the depart-
mental meetings fails baseline collegiality. He is a free rider: a person benefit-
ing from others' hard work without making his own contribution to the effort.
This is simply unfair. Moreover, his behavior is sure to affect the morale of his
colleagues, making it more difficult for them to do theirjobs well.26 This could
be true even if X were somehow to persuade his boss, the director of the legal
research and writing program, to exempt him from participation in the
meetings. Such an exemption might simply institutionalize a lack of fairness,
with further negative effect on X's colleagues. 27
25. Cf.Jawa v. Fayetteville, 426 F. Supp. 218, 223 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (upholding firing of tenured
professor who, among other things, refused to meet with his department chair when directed
to do so, saying that he "was not an office boy").
26. Cf. Kirsch v. Bowling Green State University, No. 95APII 1-1476, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2247
(Ohio C. App. May 30, 1996) (upholding denial of tenure based, in part, on Kirsch's refusal
to participate in departmental meetings discussing course content and curriculum); Bresnick
v. Manhattanville College, 864 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding denial of tenure to
dance teacher who refused to collaborate with other music colleagues to the detriment of the
students).
27. The above examples make clear that the AAUP's argument that collegiality need not stand as
a separate measurement of an academic's performance-distinct from teaching, research,
and service-is fundaimientally flawed. The faculty member's refusal to cooperate with the
dean in the first hypothetical, and X's failure to attend departmental meetings in the second,
are likely to have little or io impact on the traditional evaluation of their academic perfor-
mance. Assume, for instance, that X gets fired for his refusal to attend the staff meetings. His
defense likely would be (1) the school cannot criticize my teaching, which is by all accounts
exemplary; (2) these meetings have nothing to do with scholarship; and (3) although one
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2. Affirmative Collegiality
The best colleagues are more than passively collegial; they are actively so.
Affirmatively collegial faculty typically go beyond the call of duty in some
aspect(s) of theirjob, depending upon their interests and talents. They might
take on additional teaching assignments, perhaps to relieve an overburdened
peer, or to ensure that their colleagues can take sabbaticals when eligible, or
simply out of dedication to students. Others publish substantial quantities of
exceptional scholarship, bringing recognition not only to themselves but to
their academic institution as well. Some routinely accept extraordinary ad-
ministrative assignments, such as chairing a difficult committee or directing
an institute or center. In addition to doing their own job exceptionally well,
affirmatively collegial colleagues give of themselves to others. They guide and
nurture junior faculty; they attend and present papers at faculty workshops
and luncheons; they read and comment on colleagues' drafts; they help plan
and attend social events. The best colleagues participate in all aspects of law
school life, such as the appointments and promotion and tenure processes;
they cooperate with and support administrative units of the law school; they
volunteer for iny worthwhile institutional cause. In short, affirmatively colle-
gial faculty display enthusiasm, dedication, and a constructive attitude, and
they work hard to foster harmony among their peers and to further the
mission of their institution.2"
Just as society cannot successfully legislate morality, neither can the aca-
demic profession require affirmative collegiality. Nor should it. In further-
ance of the fundamental search for knowledge, academia must have room-
some might say, plenty of room-for productive people who may be too
consumed by their teaching, research, or external service to devote much
energy to their institution or peers. Indeed, academia should also be accept-
ing of brilliant teachers and scholars who may be narcissists or social misfits.
Nevertheless, many academics will want to aspire to be affirmatively collegial,
at least in some respects. Though such behavior cannot be mandated, institu-
tions would be well advised to foster, encourage, and reward positive,
community-oriented conduct.
may say that I am failing to serve my institution by avoiding these meetings, my overall service
record is outstanding-better than most of the rest of the writing faculty. A response based
on the AAUP's position might be that X's teaching is in fact less than exemplary because his
teaching responsibilities include collaborating with others. But this unnecessarily clouds the
issue: for instance, X may counter by arguing that collaboration is not part of his contract.
The more direct approach is to call X's conduct what it is-lack of basic collegiality-and
then determine if his violation of this norm of conduct should be sanctionable.
A fair comparison can be drawn between my definition of baseline collegiality and Heiser's
definition of collegiality derived from sociology. He says that collegiality
is best understood as citizenship in a professional collective, the ability to
collaborate with equals in a non-hierarchical organization in order to iaintai
the organization's equilibrium, further its goals, and avoid problems such as
unproductive members, excessive dominance by one or a few members, and
equal access for all members to organizational resources.
Heiser, supra note 3, at 412.
28. The AAUP claims that these characteristics should not be confused with collegiality. In
actuality, the AAUP confuses the concepts of baseline collegiality and affirmative collegiality.
See On Collegiality, supra note 7, at 1.
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3. Affirmative Uncollegiality
Unfortunately, the conduct of some law teachers is counterproductive.
These individuals move from the neutral territory of passive collegiality to the
hostile terrain of affirmative uncollegiality. They may see themselves as "watch-
dogs" or "dissidents" or "whistle-blowers," or they may think that the ends they
seek are so laudable as tojustify any means. Or they may simply have personal-
ity problems. For whatever reason, uncollegial faculty cause problems for their
colleagues and their institution.
Affirmative uncollegiality is the mirror opposite of baseline collegiality. It
can be defined as conduct that interferes with the ability of one's colleagues to do their
jobs or with the capacity of one's institution tofulfill its mission. Uncollegial conduct
can take many forms. It might be a persistent lack of civility that creates a
negative atmosphere and harms faculty morale. Or it might be the habit of
sending flaming e-mails, full of nastiness and venom, to colleagues with whom
the sender disagrees on issues of law school governance. Uncollegiality also
includes such activities as gratuitously denigrating colleagues behind their
backs; 9 shouting down opposition at faculty meetings; making false accusa-
tions and complaints about colleagues to administrators, or about either or
both to external authorities;" criticizing colleagues and the institution to
outsiders, such as employment candidates or the press; refusing to cooperate
or collaborate when these are requirements of one's job; using deceit and
other illicit means to achieve institutional goals; and acting in bad faith by
advocating and pursuing institutional goals and policies because of self-inter-
est or other illegitimate motive, rather than from a sincere evaluation of the
best interests of the institution.3 '
Lack of collegiality should not be confused with good faith criticism and
pressure for change. Sometimes a colleague will be an irritant-to his peers,
the administration, or both-precisely because he is forcing others to face
their own problems and shortcomings. As the AAUP notes, "[g]adflies, critics
of institutional practices or collegial norms, even the occasional malcontent,
have all been known to play an invaluable and constructive role in the life of
academic departments and institutions."32 But the distinction can, and must,
be made between legitimate activism and destructive behavior. Moreover, a
29. Cf. McGill v. Regents of University of California, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding denial of tenure because, in part, McGill was criticizing colleagues to candidates
for new teaching positions).
30. Cf. Stein v. Kent State University, 994 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ohio 1998), aff'd 181 F.3d 103 (6th
Cir. 1999) (upholding refusal to renew contract based upon Stein's filing of frivolous
internal and external suits and charges).
31. Occasionally a faculty member exhibits affirmatively uncollegial behavior on almost all
fronts. In Sinnott v. Skagit Valley College, 746 P.2d 1213 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), the plaintiff,
a tenured welding instructor, was dismissed for (1) making derogatory remarks about
colleagues; (2) falsely accusing his department chair of theft; (3) using profanity excessively
(4) constantly criticizing supervisors and coworkers; (5) affirmatively refusing to refrain from
the aforementioned conduct; (6) affirmatively refusing to cooperate in curriculum develop-
ment; and (7) affirmatively refusing to team-teach in a coordinated program.
32. On Collegiality, supra note 7, at 1.
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great deal depends on how a discontented colleague chooses to conduct
himself. As Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King have taught us, pro-
found disagreement and disobedience need not be uncivil.
I. The Academic Setting
A. Strains on Collegiality
Although I can't prove it empirically, I think problems with collegiality are
more prevalent in the academic setting than in other employment spheres,
and legal academia appears to experience the phenomenon at its highest
levels. Some understanding of the causes of uncollegiality in academia can
form a constructive backdrop to a discussion of what can and should be done
to combat it.
1. Shared Authority
The decision-making structure of most business enterprises is decidedly
hierarchical. Although a supervisor may solicit input from underlings, she
makes all final decisions within her realm of authority-subject, of course, to
being overruled by her supervisor, and so on up the chain of command. If a
supervisee does not like a decision, he is usually powerless to change it.
Academia, on the other hand, is characterized by a far more democratic
decision-making structure, at least with respect to its tenured faculty. In
theory, faculty members and administrators exercise shared authority over the
formulation of policy, procedures, and operating decisions. The matters
considered to be within the prerogative of the faculty typically run from the
relatively trivial, such as deciding whether eating should be permitted in
classrooms, to the extremely important, such as setting the number of credit
hours required for graduation from the institution. At law schools this demo-
cratic impulse appears to be especially strong. Many law faculties consider
their dean merely first among equals, that is, as having no significant authority
beyond that of the typical tenured faculty member. And behind this sentiment
is power. Law faculties routinely exercise a great deal of control over the
selection and retention of their dean, and they are quick to take action if they
believe that he has exceeded his power to execute faculty policy by attempting
to implement policy of his own.
Shared authority undoubtedly leads to high levels of conflict. The em-
ployee in a corporation who disagrees with company policy might carefully
mention something to his boss, but if he is rebuffed, he will likely grin and
bear it. Not so in the academic setting." A tenured teacher who disagrees with
33. The distinction is real, as I can attest from personal experience. As first assistant U.S. attorney
for the Middle District of Florida, I supervised about 100 other attorneys and about the same
number of nonattorney support personnel. The administrative structure of a U.S. attorney's
office is extremely hierarchical: after the U.S. attorney himself, the first assistant is the
second-in-command of the office. I know that on a number of occasions I participated in
decisions that upset and probably outraged one or more of the office's prosecutors. Al-
though assistant U.S. attorneys frequently voiced their opinions on the merits of particular
issues, no one ever challenged my authority or refused to accept my (or the U.S. attorney's)
ultimate judgment. By way of contrast, in tie law school setting, simply referring to the
associate dean as having "authority" vis-A-vis the tenured faculty would likely evoke contro-
versy and debate-or simply derision.
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policy has the ability to seek its change by convincing her colleagues that
change is warranted. This involves bringing the matter to the administration's
attention; getting it referred to the appropriate faculty committee; ensuring
that the committee follows though with a beneficial proposal that is placed on
the agenda of a faculty meeting; politicking in halls, offices, and dining rooms;
debating the proposal via e-mail with those who prefer electronic communica-
tion; and finally discussing, amending (or fending off amendments), and
voting on the proposal at the meeting. If the policy is important (or, unfortu-
nately, sometimes even if it isn't), the debate leading up to the vote-both
before and during the meeting-can get quite heated. If the vote is close, the
matter may be at rest only temporarily; nothing (other than a sense of
collegiality, if it exists) prevents the losing side from raising the issue again.
Multiply this process by every policy decision a school needs to make, and one
gets some sense of the possibilities for conflict and concomitant uncollegiality
in the academic setting.
2. The Tradition of Unfettered Intellectual Exchange
The culture of academia places a high value on open and honest discussion
about ideas and issues. Academics view the ability to voice opinions without
restraint, safe from review or retribution, as the essence of academic freedom.
There are few things more invigorating to an academic than a passionate
debate about intellectual matters dear to his heart. Furthermore, academics
consider remaining true to principle an essential aspect of their being. In-
deed, no one would desire or expect academics to compromise over funda-
mental differences on philosophical, scientific, or intellectual matters. Aca-
demics are thus accustomed, in effect, to being both outspoken and intransi-
gent, and to being rewarded for these qualities.
Law faculty not only function within academic culture, they are also prod-
ucts of legal training. Despite recent efforts to change their emphasis, law
schools still primarily focus on developing skills for adversarial situations, such
as the abilities to debate, argue, and persuade. The emphasis is on winning-
arguments, cases, appeals. Compromise is often taught as necessary only to
avoid total defeat. In addition, students experience law school itself as some-
thing of a zero-sum game; facing an extremely hierarchical profession, they
can't help but view high grades and class rank as critical to their future success.
In this competitive atmosphere, generally speaking, only those who rise to the
top of their class-i.e., those who are the best at this intense, adversarial
enterprise-are eligible to become law teachers. So it should come as no
surprise that law faculty frequently take academia's emphasis on uncompro-
mising and vocal debate to the extreme.
In the free-for-all atmosphere of academia, collegiality requires distinguish-
ing disagreement with or even disdain for a person's ideas from disdain for
the person. It also requires drawing distinctions between areas of intellectual
debate, where conciliation and compromise are inappropriate, and other
areas of disagreement, for instance regarding matters of institutional gover-
nance, where these behaviors are essential. Drawing such distinctions is not
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necessarily difficult, but the importance of doing so can be easily forgotten in
the heat of the moment.
3. Tenure
Not only do faculty exert a great deal of authority over institutional policy,
most do so with the protection of tenure, that is, with a lifetime appointment.
Tenure, which has come under some attack in recent years, has a long and
storied history well beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient for the
present inquiry to note that, though designed primarily to protect academics
against retribution for extreme or unpopular intellectual positions, tenure
also means that a teacher is free to take positions contrary to those of col-
leagues and university administrators on matters of institutional governance.
In effect, tenure is a tremendous leveler: it greatly reduces the authority
administrators exercise over individual faculty. A faculty member can vocally
oppose his department chair or dean-or even the provost and president-
without fear of being fired for it. Though it has some drawbacks, tenure is a
valuable practice, essential to the integrity of the academic enterprise. But
some people may experience a sense of invincibility arising from the protec-
tion of tenure, and that can lead to uncollegial behavior.
4. Autonomy
Depending upon the particular field, the academic enterprise tends to be
individualistic: faculty pursue their intellectual interests and develop their
expertise as essentially autonomous actors. This is certainly true with respect
to legal academia. Typically, each law school has one or two, or at most three,
experts in a particular area of the law, and usually they conduct their research
and writing on their own. If they collaborate, they tend to do it at an
inter- rather than intrainstitutional level. While many other endeavors re-
quire teamwork, the pursuit of legal knowledge does not, and as a result legal
academia does not place a high value on getting along well with others. A
faculty member's strong sense of intellectual autonomy can spill over into
other matters, such as institutional governance, for which teamwork and
cooperation are essential.
5. Electronic Communication
Far from unique to the academic setting, but having significant impact
upon it nonetheless, is the rise of e-mail communication. E-mail has funda-
mentally altered the nature of human interaction, particularly at the work-
place. Although much of the change is positive, electronic communication
can also have a profoundly negative impact on the level of collegiality among
a group of peers.
E-mail usage has received considerable study from academic psychologists
and others. 4 A number of points are quite well established. First, e-mail often
34. See, e.g., Psychology and the Internet, ed.Jayne Gackenbach (San Diego, 1998); Lee Sproull
& Sara Kiesler, Reducing Social Context Cues: Electronic Mail in Organization Communica-
tion, 32 Mgmt. Sci. 1492 (1986); Phillip A. Thompsen & Davis A. Foulger, Effects of
Pictographs and Quoting on Flaming in Electronic Mail, 12 Computers in Hum. Behav. 225
(1996).
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takes the place of face-to-face conversation. Indeed, in many instances e-mail
is far more efficient than face-to-face communication, especially among a
group of individuals, because it is asynchronous, that is, it need not be
conducted in real time. On the other hand, e-mail communication lacks
several extremely important features that characterize its ancient counterpart.
As they compose their messages, e-mail authors are alone at their computers,
uninfluenced by human interaction and shielded by a veil of technology.
Moreover, the messages themselves are generally devoid of visual, vocal, and
social status cues.
3 5
The unique characteristics of e-mail lead to what psychologists have la-
beled the "disinhibition effect" of electronic communication. Disinhibition is
"any behavior that is characterized by an apparent reduction in concerns for
self-presentation and the judgment of others."'6 Some aspects of disinhibition
are positive; for instance, it has been said that e-mail is an "equalizer,"
emboldening individuals to communicate across otherwise impenetrable
boundaries of social status and power. Similarly, e-mail is a means by which a
timid person may feel sufficiently comfortable to participate in a conversa-
tion. But by far the most impressive aspect of disinhibition is the negative
phenomenon of "flaming," that is, expressing oneself in extreme, hostile, and
socially unacceptable ways. Although there is some academic debate on the
nature and extent of flaming, most observers-indeed, most users of e-mail-
agree that it is a widespread problem. This has led to countless articles on e-
mail etiquette, which are, of course, useful only to the extent that someone
wants to avoid accidental flaming. Unfortunately, a considerable amount of
flaming is intentional.
Some of the previously discussed characteristics of academia can make
faculty particularly susceptible to the temptation to flame. As autonomous
units, faculty members have little need to see each other in person except at
occasional committee and faculty meetings; e-mail communication can easily
become the norm. Academics are acculturated to weigh into community
discussions, and they do so believing that it is their right, if not their duty, to
express themselves with passion and conviction. Theirjobs are secure. For a
few, passion can turn into excess, conviction into sarcasm and vitriol.
6. Ambiguity in Measuring Value
Academia is unparalleled in the ambiguity of the value of its outputs.
Businesses have the bottom line; lawyers can measure bottom line and billable
hours. Even the productivity of government workers can usually be quantified,
for example, by how many papers are processed per day, or citizeuis/customers
handled, or-for government lawyers-cases carried to completion. But the
35. Of course, we are starting to see an increased use of pictographs in e-mails, that is, typo-
graphical symbols that convey such cues as the expression of emotion or an indication that
something is meant as a joke. Pictographs increase, though very slightly, the amount of
nonverbal information that can be communicated electronically.
36. AdamJoinson, Causes and Implications of Disinhibited Behavior on the Internet, inPsychol-
ogy and the Internet, supra note 34, at 43, 44.
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valuation of teaching, research, and service is nearly impossible. For instance,
how does one compare the relative worth of different forms of scholarship?
Law faculty endlessly debate whether a law review article deserves more respect
than, say, a casebook catering to the student market, or a treatise designed for
practitioners. There is even substantial disagreement about the relative worth
of articles solicited and written for symposia compared to articles written and
submitted without a prior promise of publication. Layered on top of this
complexity is the difficulty of comparing scholarship to teaching and service. Is
a person who teaches twelve credit-hours a year and publishes an article once
every two years more or less productive than one who teaches eight credits but
publishes two pieces a year? How about one who teaches ten credits, updates a
book written a number of years ago, and oversees a department?
In this atmosphere of uncertainty, human nature tempts individual faculty
to place a higher value on their own output than that of others. The scholars
may view the "mere teachers" as neanderthals, and the teachers may see the
scholars as prima donnas who overestimate the importance of their efforts.
These tensions are exacerbated by the fact that the administration has no
choice but to take a position on these matters, if not explicitly, then implicitly
by setting salaries and determining the distribution of such perks as chairs and
high-visibility assignments. The end result is an atmosphere in which respect
among peers cannot be assumed and balkanization is not uncommon. These
are conditions ripe for incivility and uncollegiality.
B. Is Enforcement of Collegiality a Good Thing?
Given the nature of the academic enterprise, lapses in collegiality are
bound to occur. It is hard not to argue that this is unfortunate, and that the
academic world would be a better place if all of its inhabitants were at least
baseline-if not affirmatively-collegial. The more difficult issue is whether
the faculty of a particular institution, or the institution itself, should under-
take to enforce a norm of baseline collegiality among its members. Should
uncollegial behavior be tolerated as an unavoidable cost of doing business, or
should it be sanctioned? This section discusses the potential costs and benefits
of maintaining a collegial atmosphere .in any academic setting, with a special
focus on law schools.
1. Benefits
If uncollegiality is defined as behavior negatively affecting colleagues'
ability to accomplish their tasks, one of the obvious and most important
benefits of collegiality is the maintenance of an atmosphere in which indi-
vidual faculty can maximize personal productivity. Uncollegial acts are dis-
tracting and demoralizing; they result in needless expenditure of the precious
mental and physical energy of affected faculty. If lack of collegiality is the
norm on a faculty, productivity may come to a screeching halt.
Here is an example taken not from academia but from my practice of law.
When I served as first assistant U.S. attorney, one of my responsibilities
involved intervening and attempting to settle employee disputes. On one
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occasion a prosecutor, under the stress of a courthouse deadline, lost his
temper and screamed profanity at his secretary, who was trying to help him
prepare the final papers for filing. The incident occurred in a relatively small
branch office. The attorney's behavior was so out of control that several of his
colleagues reached me by conference call within minutes of the tirade. I
quickly chose a course of action that included obtaining witness statements
and presenting the matter for appropriate review and possible discipline.
This single isolated incident of incivility affected the operation of the
branch office for many days-not only in the formal sense that employees
were pulled from their regular tasks to answer questions and prepare written
statements, but also informally, by causing gossip in the halls as people
debated the facts and chose sides. Without doubt, productivity was reduced
that week. Similar conduct produces similar results in the academic setting.
Everyone has limited cognitive resources; if these resources are devoted to
being uncollegial or to reacting to the uncollegial acts of others, they cannot
be aimed at making progress in the academic mission.
Legal academics have yet another critical reason to be collegial: they are
the primary role models for future lawyers. Incivility and unethical behavior in
the practice of law have become a serious concern, and a number of commen-
tators have traced the root of the problem, at least in part, to law schools. Even
as they learn skills and substance from faculty, students also internalize subtle
and sometimes not so subtle messages about appropriate professional behav-
ior. Let's say that a teacher preaches ethics and civility to her students in class,
but then demonstrates her own lack of the same by mistreating students or by
displaying contempt for her colleagues. Of course, her students learn as much
from her actions as they do from her words-if not more.
A third reason for maintaining a collegial atmosphere is to attract and
retain quality faculty. Given the choice, no one wants to work in an institution
characterized by unpleasantness and a lack of collegiality. Anyone deciding
whether to join or leave a particular faculty undoubtedly weighs its level of
collegiality into the decision. Of course, the most productive faculty are
typically the most mobile. They are the ones most likely to leave an uncollegial
institution or to decline a job offer from one. Over time, then, lack of
collegiality can reduce a school's overall quality.
Finally, life is short. No one should have to spend it among bickering or
backbiting colleagues. In a workplace that provides a consistently upbeat,
supportive, and rewarding environment for all those who toil within it, every-
one is better off.
2. Costs
Despite collegiality's clear benefits, policies aimed at maintaining collegial-
it)' in academia are controversial. The fundamental reason for this is the
perceived tension between the enforcement of a norm of collegiality and
academic freedom. Many academics view tolerance of uncollegiality by peers
as the necessary cost of their own protection against institutional interference
with their intellectual autonomy.
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Academic freedom is a complex concept rooted in tradition, history, and
law." Our current conception of it can be traced back at least as far as
nineteenth-century Germany." Interestingly, the notion did not rise to the
highest level of American academic consciousness until 1915, when the AAUP
issued a report on the subject.39 The axioms outlined in the report were later
codified in the AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure. Reaffirmed in 1970, these principles include:
a. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of
the results subject to the adequate performance of their other academic
duties ....
b. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their
subject, but they should be carefil not to introduce into their teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject....
c. College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned
profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or
write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or
discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special
obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember
that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their
utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinion of others, and
should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the
institution ."
Many academics would probably be surprised at the limited scope and
tentative wording of the AAUP's definition of academic freedom; Read in the
most expansive fashion possible, these aspirational principles define only a
finite area in which faculty are entitled to full autonomy: scholarship and
teaching. According to the AAUP, an academic should never be sanctioned in
connection with intellectual pursuits, regardless of deviation from accepted
orthodoxy, as long as he is acting responsibly. But nowhere does the AAUP
statement entitle a member of a faculty to be uncollegial, as I have defined
that term.
Similarly, uncollegial behavior receives no protection from the complex
doctrine that has developed around the legal concept of academic freedom.4
37. A number of fascinating books have been written or compiled on the subject. See, e.g.,
Unfettered Expression: Freedom in American Intellectual Life, ed. PeggieJ. Hollingsworth
(Ann Arbor, 2000); RobertM. O'Neil, Free Speech in the College Community (Bloomington,
1997); The Future of Academic Freedom, ed. Louis Menand (Chicago, 1996); Neil Hamilton,
Zealotry and Academic Freedom 159-86 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1995); The Concept of
Academic Freedom, ed. Edmund L. Pincoffs (Austin, 1975).
38. Todd A. DeMitchell, Academic Freedom Whose Rights: The Professor's or the University's?
168 Educ. L. Rep. 1, 3 (2002).
39 Id. A history of the principle of academic freedom in the United States can also be found in
Hamilton, supra note 37, at 159-86.
40. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive
Comments <http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm> (last visited Feb. 7,
2003) (footnotes omitted).
41. An excellent overview of the legal parameters of academic freedom can be found in Steven
G. Poskanzer, Higher Education Law: The Faculty 5-142 (Baltimore, 2002).
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One aspect of this doctrine is the special free speech protection afforded
academics under the First Amendment. Despite some sweeping and dramatic
language employed in a few early Supreme Court cases, 42 this protection is
relatively circumscribed. As an initial matter, the First Amendment provides
protection only against state action; thus it constrains administrative conduct
or decision making only in the context of faculty who are employees of public
colleges and universities.43 Moreover, a number of courts have interpreted the
free speech protection afforded academics as being no greater than that
afforded to all other state employees, and others have noted the tension
between the First Amendment freedom of the university or faculty as a whole
and the freedom of its individual members." One court has even held that
academic freedom is a right exclusively retained by the university vis-A-vis the
state, as opposed to a right held by faculty members vis-A-vis their university.4
On the specific question of whether the First Amendment provides protection
for uncollegial activity, courts have uniformly answered in the negative.46
In the context of private colleges and universities, academic freedom
protects faculty from administrative action only to the extent it is embodied-
explicitly or implicitly-in a faculty member's employment contract.47 A re-
view of the cases makes clear that courts are very wary of treating a faculty
member differently from any other contractual employee.48 Indeed, often
42. For example:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation. . . . Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). Later the Court issued these words:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
43. See Poskanzer, supra note 41, at 11-16; Richard H_ Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom v.
Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29J.
C. & U. L. 35 (2002).
44. See Hiers, supra note 43, at 64-103. A full delineation of the complex law of academic
freedom is well beyond the scope of this article.
45. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cit. 2000) (en bane). Todd DeMitchell agrees with the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the First Amendment, while Richard Hiers adamantly
disagrees. See DeMitchell, supra note 38; Hiers, supra note 43.
46. The seminal case in the area is Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1981 ), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 830 (1982), in which the court explicitly upheld the ability of a university to enforce a
collegiality requirement.
47. See Poskanzer, supra note 41, at 19-22; DeMitchell, supra note 38, at 10.
48. A 1983 study concluded that defendant institutions prevailed in about 80 percent of faculty
employment cases, including First Amendment cases. The percentage for non-First Amend-
ment cases alone was even higher. See Perry A. Ziikel, Personality as a Criterion for Faculty
Tenure: The Enemy It Is Us, 33 Clev. St. L. Rev. 223, 226 (1984-85).
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special deference is given to university administrators (sometimes in the name
of academic freedom) to operate their institutions as they see fit.4" The
bottom line is that academic freedom as a contractual right of individual
academics is quite narrow. It manifestly does not protect those whose behavior
has been legitimately deemed uncollegial by their colleagues or institution."s
None of this is to say that tension between enforcement of collegiality and
academic freedom does not exist. The real problem is not actual conflict
between the two values but the risk that enforcement of collegiality will be
abused-that the autonomy of individual faculty will be unduly circumscribed
under the guise of achieving collegiality. Without doubt, this is a serious and
substantial concern. It is likely that most academics who oppose the enforce-
ment of a collegiality norm and who champion the rights of even the most
uncollegial of their colleagues do so out of fear of such abuse.
Abuse of a collegiality requirement can easily result in someone's being
punished for expressing unpopular views. Perhaps the best evidence of this is
anecdotal. A recent and somewhat notorious case on point is historian Robert
D. Johnson's denial of tenure at Brooklyn College. At age thirty-four,Johnson
was a graduate of Harvard University and the author of twenty-six scholarly
publications, including three books-two published by Harvard University
Press.5' According to media reports, Johnson "has a first rate teaching record
and consistently receives rave reviews from students."52 As late as April 2001,
the chair of Brooklyn College's history department wrote that "in every
category of measurement-in teaching effectiveness, scholarship, and in ser-
vice to the department, the college, and the university-[Johnson] has per-
formed in an exemplary manner. '' Nevertheless, in May 2002 the committee
reviewingJohnson's application for tenure recommended denial on the basis
of insufficient collegiality.54 The college followed that recommendation. 5 The
decision prompted twenty-four distinguished historians around the country to
sign a letter of protest.
56
49. The term sometimes used for this principle of deference is academic abstention. See id. at 237-
38.
50. One court has summed up the relationship between the two concepts this way: "Academic
freedom is not a license for activity at a variance with job-related procedures and require-
ments, nor does it encompass activities which are internally destructive to the proper
functioning of the university or disruptive of the educational process." Stastny v. Central
Washington University, 647 P.2d 496, 504 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), cet. denied, 460 U.S. 1071
(1983).
51. Karen W. Arenson, Star Scholar Fights for His Future at Brooklyn College, N.Y. Times, Dec.
18, 2002 <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/18/nyregion/18TENU.html>; Charm School,
New Republic, Dec. 30, 2002, at 11; David Orland, Refusing to Play the Game, Boundless
Webzine, Dec. 2002 <http://www.boundless.org/2002_2003/features/a0000691.html> (last
visited Feb. 17, 2003).
52. Orland, supra note 51.
53. Id.
54. Dorothy Rabinowitz, The Battle of Brooklyn, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 2002, 2002 WL-WSJ
103129362; Orland, supra note 51.
55. Rabinowitz, supra note 54; Arenson, supra note 51. Brooklyn College's president later
declined to follow the department's committee's recommendation not to renewJohnson's
contract for another year. See Rabinowitz, supra note 54.
56. Charm School, supranote 51, at 11.
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If consistent press reports are to be believed, Johnson's denial of tenure
had little to do with collegiality, at least as legitimately defined. Johnson was
apparently much more politically conservative than his colleagues. He raised
some hackles, for example, when he criticized a post-September 11 teach-in
at the college as too hostile to an American military response and featuring no
supporters of U.S. or Israeli policy.57 The specific locus ofJohnson's problem,
however, became the positions he advocated as a member of his department's
appointments committee.
During his tenure year Johnson apparently refused to go along with his
department chair and other colleagues who decided that a particular position
should be reserved for a woman. 5' And he took the position that the depart-
ment should not "tender a job offer to an applicant possessing neither a
complete dissertation nor strong teaching evaluations. '59 There is no question
that Johnson's stance on these issues was adamant. He charged that "the
committee's chairwoman was being heavy handed in telling [committee mem-
bers] what questions to ask [of potential candidates]. The chairwoman and
others charged that Mr. Johnson was trying to bully the committee into
accepting his views and that he would not listen to others who he believed had
not scrutinized candidates' records as carefully as he had."60Johnson opposed
making a candidate whom he saw as weak a finalist, comparing the candidate
to ajunior professor who had left the department.
Johnson's department chair reportedly considered this comparison "pre-
posterous, specious, and demeaning,"61 and ultimately decided to oppose
Johnson's bid for tenure. 62 He initially charged that Johnson had violated
certain curricular rules, but eventually took the position thatJohnson's failure
was a lack of collegiality. 63 A faculty allegedly unhappy with Johnson and his
politics were apparently ready to join the fray. Claimed lack of collegiality
became the basis ofJohnson's denial of tenure.
If these accounts are true, Robert Johnson's actions were not uncollegial.
Nothing in the reports indicates that he did anything other than express his
views about intellectual matters and the governance of Brooklyn College's
history department in complete good faith. There is no indication that he
resorted to ad hominem attacks or underhanded tactics; rather, it appears
that some of his colleagues took offense at the criticism of them that was
implicit in Johnson's own productivity and his stance on appointments. 64 He
57. Rabinowitz, supra note 54.
58. Orland, supra note 51.
59. Robert David "KC"Johnson, Why I Was Denied Tenure, History News Network, Nov. 25, 2002
<http://www.historynewsnetwork.org/articles/1122.html>.
60. Arenson, supra note 51.
61. Id.
62. Orland, supra note 51.
63. Rabinowitz, supra note 54.
64. A female colleague reportedly complained thatJohnson's criticisms and the standards he set
"terrorized" other young faculty members. Rabinowitz, supra note 54.
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was described as "unduly uncooperative,"" but-as discussed above - collegi-
ality does not require someone acting in good faith to cooperate with policies
or actions he deems contrary to the interests of his college. Indeed, it appears
thatJohnson was ousted by a hostile faculty because, in the end, he was a thorn
in some sides and failed to fit in. 6
Collegiality concerns can also be a subterfuge for illegal discrimination.
"Many people who oppose reliance* on collegiality in faculty employment
decisions argue that its use can easily become a mask for discrimination based
on race, gender, age, religion, national origin, or disability."67 Although the
discrimination might be overt, the greatest risk appears to be unconscious
discrimination-the vague feeling among a faculty dominated by white males,
for example, that a female, African-American, or Latino scholar does not seem
to be a good fit with the department or college. This vague feeling might
translate into skepticism about the outsider's scholarship, particularly if the
scholarship is unconventional. In the case of potential gender discrimination,
there are some reports that males in a department may view a woman with a
strong academic personality as "pushy," "aggressive," or "uppity."6
The recent case of Carol Stepien may be an example of this phenomenon.
Stepien, an aquatic biologist at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland,
Ohio, was widely published-author of a well-received textbook, among other
things. She brought in hundreds of thousands of dollars in grant money, and
in 1999 she received national attention for using DNA analysis to refute
arguments that a Lake Erie fish, declared extinct in 1975, had returned. That
same year, despite a reportedly outstanding record, Stepien was denied ten-
ure by Case.
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According to the New York Times, Stepien ran into trouble in her all-male
department because of her perceived "demanding and assertive" style. Suzanne
Ferguson, a retired English department chair at Case, was quoted as saying,
"Because Carol looks rather sweet and compliant, they thought they were
hiring the good daughter .... But she wasn't the good daughter. She was
abrasive, she was pushy, and she didn't consider people's feelings about their
pet projects. I was shocked by the tenure file the department had created. It
was very clear they were trying to put together things they could use against
her." Stepien moved to Cleveland State University and sued Case Western
Reserve. Ultimately the case was settled. The full details of the settlement have
never been released, but in May 2002 Case donated $10,000 to Stepien's
65- Arenson, suipra note 51.
66. Some critics have been less generous in their description of Brooklyn College's actions. The
historians protestingJohnson's denial of tenure referenced the college's "culture of medioc-
rity." See Arenson, supra note 51. Orland attributes the problem to a "department badly at
odds with itself, racked with political hostility, petty rivalry and unscrupulous opportunism."
Orland, supra note 51.
67. Connell & Savage, Does Collegiality Count? supra note 3, at 3.
68. Lewin, supra note 12, at 1.
69. Id.
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The reported facts are too ambiguous for an outsider to conclude with any
certainty whether Stepien was the victim of discrimination or a truly uncollegial
member of her department. But the flavor of the case raises the real possibility
that an all-male department simply refused to tolerate behavior by a woman
that it would have found perfectly acceptable, perhaps even admirable, in a
man. Though not conclusive, the settlement favorable to Stepien would seem
to support this interpretation.
3. Balance of Costs and Benefits
Not surprisingly, the foregoing cost-benefit analysis suggests that enforcing
collegiality has both significant potential benefits and serious potential risks.
For some, such as the AAUP, fear of the risks counsels in favor of eschewing
enforcement altogether."y I think this approach is not only unwarranted, it is
downright counterproductive. Its result is the possibility, and in some cases
the reality, of an entire department's being dominated by one or two very
aggressive bad actors. Unchecked, even one such person can make a work-
place insufferable and severely diminish an institution's overall effectiveness.
This is a terrible price to pay for the protection of everyone's perceived right
to be left alone. On the other hand, a school should be wary of empowering
collegiality police who use norm enforcement as a weapon rather than a
shield. Overall, the right answer appears to be that a faculty should work to
strike a balance; it should enforce an expectation of baseline collegiality while
guarding vigilantly against its use to silence or impede the unusual, unpopu-
lar, or unorthodox. Methods of achieving such a balance are discussed in the
next part of this article.
Ill. Promoting Collegiality
A. Location of Authority to Enforce Collegiality
If a norm of collegiality is to be enforced, the first enforcers ought to be the
faculty. Peer pressure can go a long way toward achieving an atmosphere of
institutional collegiality and-given its informal nature-is the least likely to
impinge upon anyone's academic freedom. If the faculty fails in policing one
of its own, of course, administrative action may be warranted. In addition, if
the offending faculty member's actions go beyond "mere" uncollegiality and
implicate, for example, issues of sexual harassment, administrative action
from the outset may be unavoidable.
On the other hand, faculties have been known to gang up on one of their
own.72 So prudence dictates that the official actions of a faculty, such as
recommendations regarding a colleague's promotion or tenure, be reviewed
70- Id.
71. See On Collegiality, supra note 7.
72. The Brooklyn history department's recommendation to deny tenure to Robert Johnson
appears to be a recent case in point.
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by an administrative arm of the university situated beyond the particular
department and above its daily fray. Members of such review committees
should take the collegiality concerns of a department's members seriously, for
one person's extreme lack of baseline collegiality can severely hamper col-
leagues' morale and impede the productivity of an entire department. At the
same time, the secondary reviewers should remain sensitive to the risk that
collegiality is being used as a cover for discrimination or other inappropriate
motivation. They should not reflexively support a department that appears to
be treating one of its members unfairly.73
B. Collegiality as an Explicit Requirement ofJob Perfrmance
These musings implicitly answer a second question: whether collegiality
should be an overt part of a teacher's evaluation process. The AAUP says not,
contending that notions of collegiality are inherent in teaching, research, and
service, and should be evaluated only to the extent that lack of collegiality
affects performance in one of these traditional areas.74 The AAUP is exactly
wrong on this point. Leaving collegiality in the shadows simply invites dishon-
est evaluation of a colleague's performance: a faculty unhappy with a col-
league perceived to be uncollegial will likely find something inadequate about
that person's teaching, research, or service. This is easy to do, since evaluation
of these criteria is itself quite subjective. As a result, the harmed faculty
member will be fighting ghosts. 75 And because the academy is incredibly
diverse, the university committee reviewing the department's recommenda-
tion will likely defer to its judgments, especially on issues of scholarship. The
risk of abuse of collegiality enforcement is heightened by the subterfuge.
In contrast, making baseline collegiality an explicit employment criterion
has the advantage of putting any person who joins a faculty on notice of the
requirements of the job. If the individual is engaging in behavior that his
peers view as uncollegial, pretenure and other evaluations that include a
collegiality criterion will necessarily give him notice of this fact. The resulting
open discussion would promote shared understandings of acceptable behav-
ior. If, for failing in collegiality, a department ultimately recommended against
a member's promotion or tenure, or if the dean denied him salary increases,
or if the university sought to fire him, there would be an explicit finding to
that effect in the person's employment record, presumably supported with
documentation specifying the alleged uncollegial acts. This record would be
accessible to the affected faculty member and could be contested head on.
And it would be available for examination by the university committee review-
ing the department's recommendation.
73. The existence of a reviewing body outside of the particular department, of course, is no
guarantee of the right outcome. Again, the Johnson case is relevant.
74. See On Collegiality, supra note 7.
75. The case of RobertJohnson provides evidence. Once his department chair allegedly turned
against him, the initial charge was violation of institutional policy. Only later did the claim
change to lack of collegiality.
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C. Statement of Academic Professional Responsibility
Collegiality begins at home. That is, every member of the academy should,
in the first instance, take affirmative responsibility for his or her conduct.
There are probably a number of ways that this can be accomplished. One
method is for the faculty in each department of a university to debate and
adopt its own Standards of Academic Professional Responsibility. The advan-
tages of such a process should be clear: participation in the creation of
standards would enhance the degree to which all faculty became invested in
the need to act collegially and accepted the specific standards adopted by
their department. Additionally, standards created on the local level could be
tailored to the unique functions, mission, and history of the particular depart-
ment. Of course, once a department created and ratified a set of standards,
they would become a patent expectation of the job, and new members would
be advised accordingly.
Because the concept of collegiality is complex, any set of standards should
differentiate between baseline collegiality and affirmative collegiality. The
standards should make clear that affirmative collegiality is aspirational; perfor-
mance at this level would not be institutionally mandated but would surely be
encouraged and rewarded by the institution. On the other hand, serious or
persistent lapses in baseline collegiality would subject a faculty member to a
formal response from her colleagues, institution, or both.
A sample set of standards for the law school setting appears below. They arc
written in the first person to emphasize that collegiality is, at its core, the
personal responsibility of each individual member of a faculty. The statement
is designed, in effect, as a pledge.
STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
1. Fundamental Requirements of Collegiality
1. Minimum job performance. I will do all traditional aspects of my
job-teaching, scholarship, and service-as assigned and at least
at a level consistent with the minimum expectations of my
colleagues and institution.
2. Good faith. When addressing matters of law school policy, I will
always operate in good faith, meaning that I will advocate posi-
tions that I truly believe are in the best interest of the school and
its constituencies-faculty, staff, students, and alumni-and not
those that are solely in my own self-interest.
3. Fiscal responsibility. When participating in decisions concerning
the expenditure of law school funds, I will always keep in mind
my responsibility to the law school's tuition payers, taxpayers [in
the case of a public school], and contributors, and will strive to
support expenditures that enhance the institution and further
its mission.
4. Civility. I will always treat others-colleagues, students, staff,
administrators, and outsiders (such as reporters)-with patience,
courtesy, and respect. While I may choose in appropriate con-
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texts to be tough or stern, I will never knowingly be mean, nasty,
sarcastic, aggressive, rude, or obnoxious in my interactions with
others. If the action of another makes me angry, I will calm
down before responding; I will strive never to act out of bad
temper or pique. I will always speak and write using words
appropriate for a person in my position, that is, a member of the
legal and academic professions with a responsibility to set an
example for those training to enter these professions.
5. Reciprocity. In addition to being civil, I will begin all my interac-
tions with colleagues assuming that they, too, are striving to be
the best faculty members possible and, in particular, are acting
in good faith. Recognizing that disagreements among persons
of good faith are possible and even likely, I will in all instances of
disagreement communicate my point of view without question-
ing my colleagues' motivations, integrity, competence, or right
to hold a view different from my own. When matters are settled
by faculty vote, I will accept the outcome of that vote as the
decision of the institution and strive to understand and accept
the wisdom of my colleagues. On matters about which I feel
strongly, I may continue to work to amend the policy, but always
with civility and reciprocity.
6. Respect for authority. I recognize that the dean, associate deans,
assistant deans, and other administrators have difficult jobs.
Nevertheless, in the appropriate fora, I will not hesitate to
express my views on institutional governance and my disagree-
ments with the actions or policies of the administration. But I
will strive to do so always in good faith, and always with civility
and reciprocity.
II. Aspirational Collegiality
1. Zeal. I will aspire to do all aspects of myjob-teaching, scholar-
ship, and service-to the best of my ability and in ways that bring
me personal satisfaction, contribute to the greater good, bear
well on my professional reputation, and add to the reputation
and stature of my institution.
2. Physical presence. I will strive to be a full participant in the life of
my institution, making every effort to attend faculty and com-
mittee meetings, enrichment events, candidate interviews, fac-
ulty and staff social events, optional student activities, and social
events involving students. Although I might work at home as
necessary, I will strive to work in my office at the law school
enough to ensure that my presence at the school is felt by
others, including colleagues and students.
3. Administrative support. I will provide support to the administra-
tive units of the law school-e.g., admissions, student affairs,
career services-whenever asked to the fullest extent possible.
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4. Special assignments. I will take on special assignments given to me
by my colleagues or the dean to the fullest extent possible.
5. Cordial relationships. I will strive at all times to treat my colleagues
and all other employees of the law school in a pleasant and
cordial manner. I will assist whenever possible and in any way I
can to help resolve internal conflicts and to promote productive
and harmonious relationships among all members of the law
school community.
6. Good colleague. I will strive to be an engaged and helpful col-
league, reading and commenting on drafts of others' work
when requested, and initiating and participating in informal
conversations concerning scholarship and teaching. I will share
the products of my own efforts-such as course syllabi, article
reprints, conference materials-with my colleagues whenever
these products might be useful to them.
D. Enforcement Mechanisms
Assuming that a faculty has adopted a collegiality requirement, and further
assuming everyone's best intentions, occasional lapses in baseline collegiality
will nevertheless occur. Although overreaction must be avoided, lapses in the
community's minimum expectations should be systematically addressed. The
reaction, of course, should be appropriate to the breach and should take into
account whether the malfeasant has been uncollegial in the past.
In many cases the best method of enforcing norms will be some form of
simple peer pressure. Colleagues should in the first instance police themselves
and each other, avoiding administrative intervention to the extent possible,
thereby minimizing the potential for conflict with academic freedom. At the
most basic level, someone who is witness to or the recipient of a colleague's
uncollegial conduct should acknowledge it and request that the offending
behavior be altered. For example, if one receives a flaming e-mail, one might
respond by politely pointing out that it is objectionable and informing the
flamer that the substance of the e-mail will not be addressed unless it is re-
presented in a collegial manner. The offender would then have two choices:
repackage the message or be ignored. If done with consistency, responses of
this type would likely minimize the uncollegial behavior.
If someone's uncollegial behavior is more frequent, the next level of
informal enforcement might be for a respected senior member of the faculty
to counsel the offender about his unacceptable conduct. If these relatively
benign methods fail, a faculty might want to have in place a procedure
empowering it to censure a colleague for persistent uncollegial conduct. Such
a procedure might include a technique of "charging" someone with
uncollegiality and a process through which the charge is evaluated before
coming to the full body for a vote. Obviously, the censure of a colleague could
itself be a controversial and potentially divisive event; if used at all, it should be
reserved for extreme cases involving someone whose negative behavior is
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impairing, in a profound and universal way, the faculty's ability to accomplish
its mission.
7 6
If all methods of peer pressure fail, or if the offensive conduct is such that it
could bring liability to the university if not formally addressed, administrative
action may be unavoidable. Such action would be disciplinary in nature and
would follow the path of other disciplinary matters at the institution. Typi-
cally, punishment for violations of a school's code of conduct range from an
informal oral reprimand and administrative counseling for a first offense, to a
formal written reprimand, maintained in the offender's personnel file, for
additional or more serious offenses, and ultimately to suspension or termina-
tion in the rare case of egregious or persistent misconduct.
IV. Coping with Difficult Colleagues
For most academics, uncollegial conduct is the aberration-a momentary
lapse due to stress, perhaps, or unintentional insensitivity to another's feel-
ings. Those in this vast majority would react with horror to learning that they
had offended a colleague, and they would offer an immediate and sincere
apology. Every faculty, however, is likely to have one or more members for
whom uncollegial behavior is, unfortunately, a modus operandi. Although a
very small minority, such people can dominate their peers and have an
extraordinarily negative impact on the atmosphere of their department and
the morale of their colleagues. Formal action by the faculty or the institution,
though warranted, simply may not take place. Even if formal action is pursued,
it may take months or years to implement and, if it falls short of termination,
its effectiveness may be limited. In the meantime, recipients of the uncollegial
behavior will continue to be harmed.
Accordingly, individual academics will find that they must, from time to
time, deal with one or more difficult colleagues. Recognizing this reality, and
developing some techniques to cope with it, can minimize the impact of
uncollegial behavior on one's productivity and morale. Given that difficult
people are found in all aspects of life, a number of books have been written on
the subject of dealing with them.7 Although many of these books may fairly be
categorized as pop psychology, they do in fact provide some useful guidance,
some of which is set out in this section.
78
76. The act of censuring a colleague could have secondary benefits beyond the sanctioning of
the offending party. To the extent that the persistent uncollegial conduct has harmed
morale, the act of censure would be a important step toward repairing the damage. By taking
collective action, the collegial members of the faculty would regain a sense of empowerment
and control over the atmosphere of their institution.
77. See, e.g., Muriel Solomon, WUrking with Difficult People (New York, 2002); Sandra A.
Crowe, Since Strangling Isn't An Option . . . Dealing with Difficult People-Common
Problems and Uncommon Solutions (New York, 1999); Marilyn Wheeler, Problem People at
Work (New York, 1995); Robert Bramson, Coping with Difficult People (New York, 1981).
78. I recognize that this is unusual subject matter for a lawjournal. However, I am convinced that
coping techniques for dealing with difficult colleagues are both nonobvious and important.
Some of my certainty results from having helped friends deal with people they perceived as
difficult by providing them with the information set out below.
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When one finds a particular colleague irritating, the first question to ask is
Am I the problem? Each of us sometimes reacts negatively to another person
because of our own prejudices, insecurities, or lack of patience or tolerance,
and the reaction may well be out of proportion to the other person's behavior.
Out of fairness, one should be hesitant to label another person "difficult." An
imperfect but useful measure is the opinion of others. If there appears to be a
consensus among a group of reasonable people that Zeus's behavior is
uncollegial, then it is likely that Zeus is, indeed, the problem. On the other
hand, anyone who finds himself having a difficult time dealing with lots of
different people would be well advised to consider seriously whether he is the
offending party.
Assuming, however, that the problem is Zeus, the next question to ask is Do
I need to deal with Zeus? For mere colleagues-fellow faculty members-of a
difficult person, the answer may very well be no. If that's the case, the solution
is obvious: they should not interact with him. In other words, one simple
method of handling a difficult person is avoidance. An uncollegial person
cannot be uncollegial to someone who has no contact with him. Avoidance
should also include steadfastly refusing to talk about the troublesome col-
league with others. In the first place, such gossip is impolite and uncollegial in
and of itself; in addition, participating in such conversation is an indirect
means by which people permit the uncollegial behavior to maintain a hold
over them. If all members of a faculty were to practice this kind of avoidance,
the result in many cases would be to isolate the uncollegial person and
minimize his impact on the operation and morale of the institution.
For example, tales are sometimes told about faculty who cannot resist
regularly sending flaming e-mails to their colleagues. Some recipients of these
e-mails, such as the dean and, say, the chair of a committee on which the
e-mail abuser serves, may have no choice but to open the e-mails, read them,
and respond. But many other faculty probably have the choice of deleting
without opening all e-mails sent by the flamer. In truly extreme cases, this may
be the appropriate coping mechanism. Preceding this action with a note to
the e-mail abuser politely informing her of one's decision puts her on notice
that, if she wishes to communicate, it must be through some other medium. It
also tells her that whatever aims she is seeking through this uncollegial activity
will not be achieved. If she receives a similar message from a sufficient number
of colleagues, she might even alter her destructive behavior; acting out is no
fun without an audience.
In most instances, complete avoidance will be impossible. The difficult
colleague will have to be engaged, at least on occasion. When engagement is
necessary, one should try to identify the type of difficult personality being
confronted and determine the appropriate coping strategies. Although there
are many types of difficult personalities, some are more challenging than
others, and an even smaller subset are the most likely to infect the atmosphere
of an academic institution.
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A. Hostile Aggressives (HAs)
It is not hard to recognize a hostile aggressive colleague. Hostile aggressives
are the bullies on a faculty: they attempt to get their way by intimidating
others-by shouting at faculty meetings, glaring at anyone who disagrees with
them, or sending overbearing memoranda or e-mails. They are sure they are
right, and they will see to it that all others agree. They walk right over weaker
personalities. As Sandra Crowe describes them:
Aggressive people are loud; their gestures are intimidating; they try to plow
through others with force. They interrupt, push, and manipulate. They're
argumentative and they project a hateful attitude. [They] can be situationally
difficulty or genetically difficult. The former can't negotiate life's bumps and
curves; the latter take pleasure in being difficult.... They're... explosive and
rude. Not only don't they consider your needs, but they don't stop to think
you might have any."0
Robert Bramson notes that HAs are often arrogant and contemptuous of
their -victims, "considering them to be inferior people who deserve to be
bullied and disparaged.' He points out that HAs may attempt to achieve
their dominance not only through tirade, but also through unrelenting criti-
cism and argument that pushes others into acquiescence, often against their
own better judgment. An HA's entire demeanor expresses attack, and the
reaction he gets is usually fright and flight.
The first rule of thumb when dealing with an HA is to avoid returning
aggression with aggression. If one tries to take on an HA head to head, the
result will simply be an escalation in the level of hostility. Moreover, a respon-
dent who plays in the HA's arena is likely to lose the fight. HAs are profession-
als at being combative; they have built a repertoire of aggressive tactics over a
lifetime and resort to them because they are usually successful. A non-HA
trying to battle an HA is a mere amateur, and is likely to get his head handed
to him in rude-to-rude combat."'
On the other hand, one cannot afford to show weakness: the HA will smell
blood and move in for the kill. So colleagues must learn to respond to the
HA's onslaught by being firm and assertive without being aggressive. 82 The
goal is to demonstrate to the HA that his usual arsenal of obnoxious actions
will not succeed. Once convinced, he will either take his hostility elsewhere, or
slowly employ less aggressive means of communication, because these will
become his only means of achieving success.
The specific steps one should take when faced with aggressive behavior:
1. Mentally prepare. Remind yourself that the HA's attack is not really
personal-it is the means by which he deals with the world. Step back from the
attack and mentally rise above it. If you take what the HA says to heart, you will
79. Crowe, supra note 77, at 116-17.
80. Branson, supra note 77, at 12.
81. Bramson, supra note 77, at 17-18. Another reason not to return the aggression is that, if you
do, others may see you as the hostile aggressor. Id. at 19.
82. Crowe, supra note 77, at 117.
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not be able to deal with him with detachment, which is what a successful
encounter will require. 3
2. Do not engage thefight. Let the verbal tirade go on without reaction. Do
not respond in kind. Eventually, the HA's steam will run out and you can
engage him on the territory of your choosing. If his onslaught is unrelenting,
consider simply leaving and postponing any interaction until another time.
84
3. Standfirm. This advice is both literal and figurative. The HA is expecting
you to show weakness-in your body language or words, or both. Think about
your posture, mentally confirm your resolve. Lean toward the HA, look her
directly in the eye. Speak firmly and directly, without aggression or hostility.8"
4. Express your disapproval. You should tell the HA, calmly and politely, that
his aggressive behavior is not acceptable and, more important to the HA, will
not be effective in achieving his results. Advise him that you will not tolerate
being treated in a rude or hostile manner.8 6
5. Engage the substance. Ask the HA to restate his position in an acceptable
manner, or restate the substance of his position for him. If his aggressive
behavior subsides, take up the matter on its merits.8 7
6. Remain firm. Throughout your interaction, remain committed to
nontolerance of unacceptable behavior. If he tries to interrupt you, say, "You
interrupted me," and continue speaking.8" If he resorts to aggressive behavior
again, call him on it.
7. Be prepared to terminate the interaction. If the aggressive behavior is unre-
lenting, end the interaction. Let the HA know why you are ending it, and tell
him that you are prepared to discuss the matter at another time when he can
manage to treat you with appropriate respect.89
An interesting thing about HAs is that they may end up respecting people
who are not intimidated by them. So resolve may be rewarded with overtly
friendly behavior. Obviously, positive behavior ought to be reinforced; friend-
liness should be returned in kind. 8
B. Sarcastic Wits (SWs)
Law teachers are smart people, and smart people sometimes show their
aggression through sarcasm and wit. If used as a weapon, unrelenting sarcasm
83. Crowe calls this step "neutralizing." Crowe, supra note 77, at 118-19.
84. See Wheeler, supra note 77, at 40; Solomon, supra note 77, at 13; Crowe, supra note 77, at 120-
85. See Crowe, supra note 77, at 119-20; Solomon, supra note 77, at 20.
86. See Wheeler, supra note 77, at 40.
87. See Crowe, supra note 77, at 121-28.
88. See Bramson, supra note 77, at 16.
89. See Wheeler, supra note 77, at 40.
90. A variation of thc HA is the "exploder": a person who is collegial most of the time but is prone
to fits of anger and outbursts, which Bramson calls "adult tantrums." Bramson, supra note 77,
at 34. Exploders are generally easier to deal with than lAs because they are not consistently
aggressive. Dealing with an exploder is similar to dealing with an HA; one should focus on
giving her time to run out of steam and regain self-control. See id. at 37-41.
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can be every bit as rude and intimidating as a direct attack. The sarcastic
person simply clothes the attack in purported humor, setting up the defense
that she is "only joking" if challenged.
A common response to a sarcastic attack is to pretend that it did not take
place. Worse, because of social convention, witnesses to sarcasm directed at
another person often laugh-though perhaps uncomfortably-at the sup-
posed humor. These responses, though polite on the surface, empower the
SW to control the situation and encourage additional uncollegial behavior.
The presence of an SW on.a faculty, if the behavior is unchecked, can mean
demoralized capitulation.
Just like other hostile aggression, sarcastic behavior needs to be acknowl-
edged and handled. The first step is to "surface the attack"; that is, the
recipient should ask the SW who has just made an indirect critical remark
whether she meant the criticism. Usually the SW will deny the intent. This
should be accepted on its face; by bringing the attack out into the open and
forcing the denial, the recipient has made the point that the sniping behavior
will not be tolerated.9 The next step, however, should be constructive. To the
extent that the sarcasm indicated a real problem, the substance of the prob-
lem should be dealt with in a nonconfrontational manner. This does not
mean capitulation, but constructive engagement.
9 2
C. Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD)
By far the most difficult people to deal with are those with true personality
disorders. As defined by the bible of psychiatric diagnosis, the DSM-IV, a
personality disorder is "an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior
that deviates markedly from the expectation of an individual's culture, is
pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is
stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment."9 3 People with personal-
ity disorders consistently "act in disturbing patterns of behavior in both
occupational and social relationships." 94 Common types of personality disor-
ders include paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal, antisocial, narcissistic, histrionic,
borderline, obsessive compulsive, avoidant, dependent, and passive aggres-
sive.95 Individuals with personality disorders can be quite functional; it is not
uncommon to find them in the workplace. One study estimated that eighty
percent of Americans have to deal with at least one person at work whose
personality traits appear to fit one of the recognized disorders.
96
91. See Bramson, supra note 77, at 29-30; Solomon, supra note 77, at 141; Wheeler, supra note 77,
at 54.
92. See Bramson, supra note 77, at 31-32; Solomon, supra note 77, at 141-44.
93. American Psychiatric Association, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, 4th ed., 629 (Washington, 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
94. Alan A. Cavaiola & Neil L. Lavender, Toxic Coworkers: How to Deal with Dysfunctional
People on the Job 4 (Oakland, 2000).
95. Id. at 4-5.
96. See id. at 3.
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Each personality disorder is characterized by its own set of problematic
behaviors that can cause coworkers anguish and stress. Of all the disorders,
however, "the borderline is probably the most difficult to deal with and the
greatest challenge to organizational structure. This is due to the fact that the
smooth functioning of any [organization] is dependent on the ability of its
people to work cooperatively with one another. The core problem of the
borderline is the inability to have stable and sane relationships.""7
The formal diagnostic criteria for BPD are set out in the DSM-IV:
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image
and affects, and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present
in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. [F]rantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment....
2. [A] pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships
characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and
devaluation [.]
3. [I]dentity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image
or sense of self[.]
4. [I] mpulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g.,
spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating)....
5. [R]ecurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating
behavior[.]
6. [A]ffective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense
episodic dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours
and only rarely more than a few days).
7. [C]hronic feelings of emptiness[.]
8. [I]nappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g.,
frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights) [.]
9. [T]ransient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative
symptoms[.] 9
In short, borderlines have an intense and deep-seated fear of abandonment.
The fear itself is usually buried; it is most commonly manifested as anger at
those who cause the borderline to sense rejection, whether real or imagined.9
In the workplace, this often means that a borderline is intensely sensitive to
minor slights or negative feedback. For example, he might interpret a
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colleague's being late for an appointment as an indication that the colleague
doesn't like him and wants to end any positive relationship with him.' 0
Persons suffering from BPD also exhibit a psychological phenomenon
called splitting. Splitting is seeing people and things as all or nothing, black or
white, good or evil. It is the inability to integrate emotional data and formulate
a middle ground. Borderlines either love a person or hate him, and they often
move quickly from love to hate after some perceived disappointment or
insult.' In the academic setting, for example, a borderline might initiallyview
an incoming dean as the savior of the institution, and anticipate that the new
administrator will effect wonderful, fabulous, unimaginable improvement to
the school. But the honeymoon ends quickly; as soon as the new dean makes a
decision with which the borderline disagrees, the dean becomes the enemy.
Splitting also causes borderlines to focus on their latest interaction with
another person. So, for instance, even if a colleague has for years supported
the position of the borderline on issues of faculty governance, their relation-
ship may be permanently harmed as soon as the first disagreement arises. 02
Borderlines also lack a core identity or sense of self. "Core values are about
the things that we love the most in life, the things that we aim our energies and
efforts at achieving, the things we want most in life.., the very essence of who
we are." Lacking core values, the borderline "gets tossed around by every
intense passion, temptation, and fad that comes her way."103 Identity issues
cause the borderline to be impulsive and, for some BPD sufferers, prone to
suicide and self-mutilation.0 4 The borderline's often obnoxious outward be-
havior stems from unconscious efforts to mask excruciating inner torture.0 5
Borderlines exhibit excessive and intense mood swings, and they harbor
constant underlying anger and contempt. The latter often leaks out as cyni-
cism or sarcasm, or it may result in an explosion of rage. "When the borderline
becomes angry, they hate everyone and everything, often attacking blindly
and wildly.... This hatred can be highly toxic to those around them, and, in
the organizational environment, may often lead to litigation as the borderline
misinterprets the actions of others as being deliberately malevolent.' 0 6
Borderlines typically present several additional personality traits. As they
split issues into black and white, they frequently have an uncanny ability to
draw other persons into their battles, making them take sides.' They are
often referred to as "manipulative," though some psychologists reject this
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term because it implies intentionality and blame, which these psychologists
claim is not present. 05 People who interact with a borderline, however, are
likely to feel manipulated: the borderline's intense personality always seems to
be focused on what others must do to satisfy her needs, and her needs are
endless.' Borderlines also lack the ability to respect interpersonal bound-
aries.1 They are the coworkers most likely to invade a colleague's personal
space; they may call or e-mail someone at home at any hour of the day or
night, or attempt to insinuate themselves, uninvited, into a coworker's per-
sonal life."' Finally, borderlines typically do not recognize that they have a
problem; rather, they believe everyone else is at fault. Indeed, this trait makes
them among the most difficult patients that psychologists encounter: as soon
as the psychologist suggests that the borderline's own behavior might be the
source of some of her problems, the borderline interprets this as abandon-
ment and turns against the would-be caregiver."
Persons with BPD are so prevalent and problematic that many books have
been written to advise how to deal with them. Most of these books are aimed at
those whose relationship with the borderline is close and essentially inescap-
able-parents, children, spouse."' For coworkers, probably the most impor-
tant factor in coping with a borderline is recognizing the personality disorder
in action. Once it is recognized, a person with BPD can be handled effectively.
The most important tool is maintaining detachment: the borderline simply
cannot control his need to act out, so one must not take his insulting or
manipulative behavior personally. Reacting personally simply means playing
on the borderline's warped turf. Rather, one should try to understand that the
borderline's anger is really hurt, and to meet it, if at all possible, with compas-
sion rather than retaliation. 4
Equally important, one must constantly be on guard to avoid getting caught
up in the borderline's psychological gyrations. This means setting boundaries
and sticking to them. The boundaries may need to include strict limits on the
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time, place, and manner in which one is willing to interact with the border-
line. If the borderline respects the boundaries, communication can take
place. If not, communication should be terminated until such time as the
borderline can regain control and act within the limits set."5
Experts provide this additional advice for dealing with a borderline in the
workplace:
If the borderline is too dysfunctional, you will need to let them know that you
are just there to do yourjob and have no desire to have a personal relationship
with them.... Be sure not to get ensnared in their personal problems. Never
ask them to bend the rules for you or to give you special consideration
because they will ask you for the same some day. Never ask them to become
involved in your personal life. . . . Stick to your job and minimize your
interactions with them. Finally, you should understand that the borderline
might back you into a position where you have no choice but to do some
things that are unpleasant to you. This might take the form of having to
report them to your supervisor for things like sexual harassment, physical or
verbal abuse, or some other boundary violation. [On the other hand,] you
might be called upon to . . . defend yourself against accusations which they
have made against you.'
Finally, colleagues of a borderline should always remember that BPD
behavior is rooted in deep-seated psychological issues and, unless the border-
line is in therapy, is not going to change. Hoping that the borderline will
behave better in the future is probably fantasy, and attempting to alter the
borderline's behavior in the present is an exercise in futility. The only thing
that coworkers can change is themselves. They can decide to set limits and to
detach, so that the impact of the borderline's machinations on their morale
and on their institution's effectiveness is minimized.'
1 7
The problem of collegiality in academia is like a crazy aunt in the family:
ever present, whispered about in hallways, but rarely acknowledged directly.
My goal in this article has been to initiate the demise of this pattern of
unhappy toleration. The toleration stems, in large part, from an apparently
widespread fear that attempts to control colleagues' uncollegial conduct will
result in an unacceptable diminution of academic freedom. Although these
concerns are legitimate, I have sought to prove that, if appropriate care is
taken, academic freedom may flourish at the same time that a norm of basic
collegiality is enforced. Failure to maintain collegiality is potentially costly to
the morale and productivity of an institution. The first line of defense in the
battle for collegiality is manned by the faculty themselves; they must person-
ally commit to collegial behavior, and they should use peer pressure to assure
that their colleagues do the same.
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I have also attempted to address another controversial subject: what to do
when simple peer pressure fails and other institutional enforcement mecha-
nisms have either been ineffective or have not yet been engaged. The end
result is the presence on the faculty of a person whose behavior threatens to
disrupt others' ability to do their jobs and the capacity of the institution to
accomplish its mission. The subject is controversial because it necessarily
acknowledges, openly and honestly, that difficult individuals thrive in the
midst of academia. Once this reality is confronted, however, steps can be
taken to ensure that their behavior is contained and their harm to the
institution is ameliorated or, in the best of all possible worlds, eliminated.
